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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
EMILY MEHEW, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No- 20020297-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from two convictions for receiving stolen property, both class B 
misdemeanors, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-408 (1999). This Court has 
jurisdiction of the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996 & Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Was the warrantless seizure and search and defendant's car justified under the 
automobile exception where the car was readily mobile and defendant concedes that 
there was probable cause to believe the car contained contraband? 
A "bifurcated" review standard applies. The trial court's factual findings are 
reviewed deferentially, and reversed only for clear error. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
935-940 (Utah 1994). The trial court's conclusions of law however, are reviewed for 
correctness, allowing some "measure of discretion" as regards the application of legal 
standards to the facts. Id. A trial court's determination of exigent circumstances is a 
question of fact which will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. State v. 
Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 657 (Utah App. 1996). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES 
U.S. CONST, amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in the persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with financial transaction card fraud, a third degree felony, 
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-506.1 (1999), and two counts of receiving stolen 
property, both class B misdemeanors, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-408 
(1999).1 Following a preliminary hearing, the trial court dismissed the felony charge and 
bound defendant over on the misdemeanor charges only (R20; R142:42-43). 
Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrantless search of 
her car (R26-48).2 Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court orally denied the 
motion on the ground that the warrantless search was justified under the automobile 
exception to the warrant requirement (R143:3 0-31) (copies of the pertinent transcript 
!In an apparent oversight, the Information cites to UTAH CODE ANN.§ 41-6-46(1) 
(1998) (motor vehicle speed restrictions), rather than the receiving statute, Section 76-6-
408 (see R2). 
:The pleadings volume is numbered in reverse chronological order. 
2 
pages are contained in addendum A). Defendant filed a second motion to suppress 
claiming that police created any exigent circumstances when they interviewed and 
arrested defendant in front of her family (R49-92). The trial court denied this second 
motion in a written decision, distinguishing defendant's authority on the ground that it did 
not deal with the automobile exception and also found that the police had not created the 
exigency (Rl 13-103) (a copy of the trial court's written decision is contained in 
addendum B). 
Thereafter, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the misdemeanor charges 
(Rl 18-120). The trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent terms of six months in 
the county jail (R129-30). The trial court then stayed defendant's sentence pending 
appeal (R145.3-4). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R134). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS3 
Defendant and her boyfriend used stolen credit cards to purchase maintenance 
services for her car and to purchase and install a $750 car stereo. 
In November 2000, Officer Bean of the Provo City Police Department investigated 
two seemingly unconnected automobile burglaries in Orem and Provo (R142:24). In 
Orem, a vehicle belonging to Dustin Dastrup was burglarized and Dustin's wallet, 
3The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling denying 
defendant's motion to suppress. State v. Tetmeyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App. 
1997). Because it appears the trial court relied on a copy of the preliminary hearing 
transcript (see R143:6), the State's recitation of facts is also supported by reference to the 
preliminary hearing transcript (see R142), in addition to the suppression hearing 
transcripts (see R143 and R144). 
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containing his checks, credit cards, and cash was taken (R142:6). In Provo, a vehicle 
belonging to Joel and Linda Clark was burglarized and a Franklin Planner containing 
Joel's driver's license, checkbook, several third party checks, and Linda's debit card, was 
taken (R142:l 1,15). 
Although Joel closed his bank account immediately after discovering the theft, he 
reported to Officer Bean that Linda's debit card had been used the morning after the 
burglary, at Jiffy Lube and Sound Warehouse (R142:9-10,24-25). Officer Bean 
contacted Jiffy Lube and obtained a copy of the receipt and a description of the person 
who had used Linda's debit card (R142:25). The receipt was signed "Dustin Dastrup" 
and listed an old address from Dustin's driver's license and the license plate number of 
the vehicle (id.). A license plate check revealed that the license was for a 1995 Chevy 
Beretta belonging to defendant (id.). 
Officer Bean next visited Sound Warehouse and spoke with Kyle Allman, the sales 
person who sold the stereo which was installed in defendant's car and charged on Linda's 
debit card (id.). Kyle reported that a male and a female purchased the stereo and gave a 
description of the male which matched the description received from Jiffy Lube 
(R 142:26). Officer Bean then showed Kyle a photo lineup which included a picture of 
defendant (R142:27). Kyle immediately identified defendant as the female accomplice 
and stated he had attended school with her (R143:12-13; R142:27). Kyle also said that 
defendant and her boyfriend said they were going to Wendover that day (R143:13). 
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Officer Bean asked the Orem Police Department to periodically check defendant's 
home and report if the Chevy Beretta was there (R143:10-11; R142:28). A day or two 
later, the Orem Police Department contacted Officer Bean around midnight and reported 
to him that defendant's Chevy Beretta was parked in the driveway of her home (R143:10-
11; R142:28). Officer Bean immediately drove to defendant's house and, while 
traversing the driveway to knock on the front door, looked at the car stereo in defendant's 
Chevy Beretta through the window (R143:l 1; R142:28). The face plate of the stereo 
exactly matched the stereo purchased with Linda's debit card (R143:l 1; R142:28). 
Officer Bean knocked on the door and defendant's mother answered (R142:28). 
Defendant was asleep, but in response to Officer Bean's questioning, her mother and 
sister said her boyfriend's name was Tyson (R142:28; R143:13)- At that point, defendant 
was awakened, and Officer Bean questioned her about her whereabouts on 21 November 
2000 and the purchase of the stereo (R142:28). Defendant replied that she had been home 
all day (R142:29; R143:13). When Officer Bean asked defendant if she had gone to 
Wendover with anyone, she replied that she had been to Wendover with Dustin Dastrup 
(R142:29; R143:13). When Officer Bean told defendant that he knew she had not been 
with Dustin, she confessed that her boyfriend's name was Tyson and that he had 
purchased the stereo at Sound Warehouse for her car (R142:29; R143:14-15). Defendant 
told Officer Bean that her boyfriend had used her car that day, that he had access to it, and 
that he used it occasionally (R142:38; R143:15). However, defendant refused to give 
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Officer Bean Tyson's last name or any contact information (R142:29). Officer Bean 
arrested defendant for obstruction of justice and possession of stolen property (R142:33). 
Because he needed the stereo as evidence, Officer Bean impounded the car both to 
secure the stereo and to allow a Sound Warehouse employee to safely remove it 
(R 142:29; R143:15). Officer Bean was concerned to secure the car because Tyson had 
access to it, Tyson's location was unknown, and defendant or her family might relay 
information to Tyson about defendant's arrest (R143:15-16). 
At the impound yard, police conducted an inventory search of defendant's car and 
discovered a green backpack containing Joel's planner and checkbook (R142:29-30). 
When Officer Bean showed defendant the backpack, and before he asked her any 
questions, defendant blurted, 'That's my backpack" (R142:30). Defendant claimed that 
Tyson had put the planner and checkbook in her backpack (Rl42:38). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant concedes that police had probable cause to believe her car contained 
contraband. Therefore, because defendant's car was also readily mobile, the warrantless 
seizure and search of defendant's car was justified under the automobile exception to the 
warrant requirement The trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress should 
be affirmed. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
THE WARRANTLESS SEIZURE AND SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S 
CAR WAS JUSTIFIED UNDER THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION 
BECAUSE THE CAR WAS READILY MOBILE AND BECAUSE 
DEFENDANT CONCEDES THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO 
BELIEVE IT CONTAINED CONTRABAND 
Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, "[i]f a car is readily 
mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth 
Amendment... permits police to search the vehicle without more." Maryland v. Dyson, 
527 U.S. 465,467 (1999) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 (1996) 
(emphasis added)). Defendant concedes probable cause to search for contraband here and 
makes no claim that her car was anything other than "readily mobile/* Aplt. Br. at 9-15. 
Accordingly, the instant warrantless seizure and search was justified 
Proceedings below. The trial court denied defendant's two motions to suppress 
below, finding that the warrantless seizure and search of defendant's car was justified 
under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 
Specifically, in response to defendant's first motion, the trial court orally found that 
police discovered defendant's car at approximately 1:00 a.m., that defendant's 
unaccounted for accomplice/boyfriend had access to the car, and that defendant or her 
family may alert him to her arrest (R 143:30-31), add. A. 
The trial court also rejected defendant's second motion to suppress in which 
defendant argued that the exigency was created by the police when they interviewed and 
arrested defendant in front of her family (see R104-113). The trial court distinguished 
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defendant's authority on the ground that it did not deal with the automobile exception, but 
rather involved searches of residences {see, e.g., R108-107), add. B. Moreover, the trial 
court disagreed with defendant that police were required to delay their investigation until 
they had obtained a search warrant for defendant's car (R106), add, B. Finally, the trial 
court found that defendant's unaccounted for accomplice/boyfriend "had ready access to 
the vehicle" which access existed "before the officer ever knocked on the door to 
interview the defendant"(R105), add. B. Thus, the trial court rejected defendant's claim 
that police created the exigency justifying the warrantless search of her car (id.). 
The Automobile Exception Applies Here. Relying solely on the Fourth 
Amendment, on appeal defendant again claims that exigent circumstances did not justify 
the immediate seizure and search of her car following her arrest and that any exigency 
was created by Officer Bean when he interrogated and arrested her in front of her family. 
Aplt. Br. at 9-15. In so arguing, defendant overlooks controlling precedent from the 
United States Supreme Court clarifying that "the automobile exception does not have a 
separate exigency requirement 'If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to 
believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment... permits police to search the 
vehicle without mon.'"Dyson, 527 U.S. at 467 (quoting Labron, 518 U.S. at 940). See 
also United States v. Graham, 275 F3d 490, 509 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Dyson and Labron 
and observing that "most recently the Supreme Court has emphasized that no special 
exigency is required to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile when the car is 
mobile and the searching officer has probable cause to believe that fruits of a crime may 
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be present in the automobile"); Reyes v. State, 954 S.W.2d 199,204 (Ark. 1997) ("The 
weight of authority appears to support the conclusion that an exigent circumstance exists 
when a car is readily movable by any person and not just the defendant"), cert, denied, 
U.S. , 122 S.Ct. 1625 (2002). The rationale for the automobile exception is 
"based on both the inherent mobility of cars (as it is often impracticable to obtain a 
warrant before a car can be driven away) and the fact that there is a reduced expectation 
of privacy with motor vehicles." United States v. Mercado, 307 F.3d 1226,1228 (10th Cir. 
2002) (citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386,390-393 (1925), and Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132,153 (1925)). Accord People v. Martinez, 32 P.3d520, 525 (Colo. 
App.), cert, denied, P.3d (Colo. 2001). 
Here, defendant concedes that police had probable cause to believe her car 
contained contraband. Aplt. Br. at 9. While defendant does not expressly concede that 
her car was "readily mobile," Dyson, 527 U.S. at 467; Labron, 518 U.S. at 940, she does 
not claim otherwise. Aplt Br. at 9-15. Nor could she: defendant or her 
accomplice/boyfriend drove the car day the stereo was installed and the day it was 
discovered at her house which discovery lead to defendant's arrest (R142:9-10, 24-29; 
R143:12-13). Police could not and did not create this ready mobility or inherent 
exigency; therefore, defendant's claims in that regard are inapposite. 
Defendant relies on two cases to support her claim of a police manufactured 
exigency: State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1993), and State v. Kelly, 963 P.2d 
1211 (Id. App. 1998). See Aplt. Br. at 11-15. However, neither case involves the 
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automobile exception to the warrant requirement, or a warrantless search of an 
automobile. Rather, both deal with warrantless intrusions of a dwelling and are thus are 
distinguishable on that ground. See Beavers, 859 P.2d at 12; Kelly, 963 P.2d at 1213. 
Dwellings are subject to a heightened expectation of privacy and are not ordinarily 
readily mobile; therefore, courts properly require a separate showing of exigency to 
justify the warrantless entry of a home. Ibid. See also Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153-354 
(stressing that a motor vehicle differs from a "store, dwelling house, or other structure . . . 
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the 
warrant must be sought**); Graham, 275 F.3d at 507 (observing that "[s]ince Carney, [471 
U.S. at 391-392],'* recognized "that a car's occupants have a lesser expectation of privacy 
in their car than in their home due to our society's pervasive regulation of automobiles, 
the necessity of a special exigency" in automobile searches "has waned'* and is no longer 
required "when the car is mobile"). 
Moreover, as recognized by the Utah Supreme Court, "police [are] not required to 
seek a search warrant at the exact moment they acquiref] the minimum amount of 
evidence to meet the probable cause requirement Holding otherwise would penalize 
police for thorough investigations and impede efforts to comply with constitutional 
mandates." State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1237 (Utah 1996) (plurality opinion). See 
also State v. Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125,1127 (Utah) (recognizing that police "are charged 
generally with the duty of searching out any crime, obtaining evidence and prosecuting 
those engaged therein. When a police officer sees or hears conduct which gives rise to 
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suspicion of crime, he has not only the right but the duty to make observations and 
investigations to determine whether the law is being violated; and if so, to take such 
measures as are necessary in the enforcement of the law"), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 971 
(1977). 
Because defendant's car was readily mobile and because police had probable cause 
to believe it contained contraband, the warrantless seizure and search of the car was 
justified under the automobile exception and should be upheld. Dyson, 527 U.S. at 467; 
Labron, 18 U.S. at 940; Mercado, 307 F.3d at 1228; Martinez, 32 P.3d at 525. 
Defendant Has Not Requested a Separate State Constitutional Review. 
Notably, defendant has not requested a separate state constitutional analysis here. And . 
for good reason—Utah courts have long "endeavored toward uniformity in the 
application of the search and seizure requirements of the state and federal constitutions, 
particularly since the respective provisions are practically identical." State v. Anderson, 
910 P.2d 1229,1235 (Utah 1996) (plurality opinion). The plurality opinion in Anderson, 
issued just six months before Labron, and four years before Dyson, recognizes that both 
the state and federal constitutions require "that warrantless searches of automobiles be 
justified by a showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances." 910 P.2d at 1237. 
Thus, even thougfi Anderson requested a separate state constitutional analysis, there was 
"no need" to interpret the state constitution more narrowly than its federal counterpart 
with regard to the automobile exception. Id. at 1236. The Anderson plurality accordingly 
instructed that "Utah courts should construe article I, section 14 [of the state constitution] 
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in a manner similar to constructions of the Fourth Amendment except in compelling 
circumstances." 910 P.2d at 1235.4 See State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460,466 (Utah 1990) 
(plurality) (noting then prevalent confusion as to automobile exception requirements and 
clarifying that under state constitution, "warrantless searches will be permitted only 
where they satisfy their traditional justification, namely, to protect the safety of police or 
the public, or to prevent the destruction of evidence"). 
To the extent Anderson may be read to suggest that a state constitution question 
remains open, i.e., whether the state constitution has a separate exigency requirement, 
defendant has not requested a separate state constitutional analysis here. Aplt. Br. at 8-
15. Moreover, as set forth previously, Labron and Dyson control the Fourth Amendment 
issue and clarify there is no separate exigency requirement thereunder the "ready 
mobility"of a vehicle is sufficient in itself "to excuse failure to obtain a search warrant 
once probable cause to conduct a search is clear." Labron, 518 U.S. at 940 (citing Carney, 
471 U.S. at 390-391). 
Importantly, Labron and Dyson do not purport to eliminate the exigency 
requirement of the automobile exception, but rather to recognize that the "ready 
4Three justices filed opinions concurring in the result of the lead opinion. While 
the justices disagreed regarding the framing of a specific test or analytical approach for 
determining when or whether to interpret the state constitution differently than the federal 
constitution, they all agreed that there was no reed to depart from the federal standard for 
automobile searches. See Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1239 (Zimmerman, C.J., concurring in 
the result); id. at 1239-1241 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result); id. at 1241-1242 
(Durham, J., concurring and dissenting). 
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mobility "of automobiles is an inherently exigent circumstance. Labron, 518 U.S. at 940; 
Dyson, 527 U.S. at 467. In other words, when a readily mobile car is to be searched it is 
not necessary to additionally demonstrate that its occupants are alerted to the police 
investigation or that police or anyone else is in danger as suggested in Anderson, 910 P.2d 
at 1237. If a vehicle is not readily mobile, however, police must first seek a search 
warrant. Compare Lavicky v. Burnett, 758 F.2d 468,475 (10th Cir. 1985) (warrantless 
seizure and search of defendant's truck invalid in part because vehicle immobile due to 
dismantled engine), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986), and Mercado, 307 F.3d atl228 
(applying automobile exception to a car temporarily immobilized due to a "readily 
repairable problem," recognizing that circumstance "[did] not remove the vehicle from 
the category of 'readily mobile'"). The ready mobility of a car is thus alone sufficient to 
establish that its contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained. It 
necessarily follows that it is also sufficient to excuse police with probable cause to search 
from obtaining a search warrant Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1237; Labron, 518 U.S. at 940; 
Dyson, 527 U.S. at 467.5 Accordingly, the instant warrantless search was justified. This 
5Even if a separate demonstration of exigency was required, such is present on 
these facts. Prc-Labron/Dyson authority demonstrates that the fact that defendant's 
accomplice/boyfriend was unaccounted for was itself an exigent circumstance (R142:38; 
R143:15-16). See, e.g., United States v. Markling, 7 F.3d 1309,1319 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of car because defendant's associates 
might move it at any time); United States v. Forker, 928 F.2d 365, 369 (11th Cir. 1991) 
(exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of car because police not certain how 
many keys to car existed or whether car would remain in parking lot if warrant was 
sought, police had not apprehended all suspects, and car was vulnerable to efforts of 
defendant's cohorts to seize or destroy evidence). 
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Court should apply the automobile exception and affirm the denial of defendant's motion 
to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's ruling denying defendant's to suppress should be upheld and 
defendant's consequent misdemeanor convictions for receiving stolen property should be 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on ^flcJecember 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
DECKER 
assistant Attorney General 
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Addendum A 
Addendum A 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
1:1-3 r^cs 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UT7 
rAH^L/ 
STATE 
EMILY 
. 
OF UTAH, 
VS 
MEHEW, 
Custody: Own 
Plaintiff, ) 
• ) 
Defendant. ) 
Recognizance ) 
CASE NO. 001404574 
Supression Hearing 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDGE CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
125 NORTH 100 WEST 
PROVO, UTAH 84601 
CERTIFIED TRANSCRIBER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
JUNE 12th, 2001 
TRANSCRIBED BY: Lora Barker, Certified Court Transcriber 
ORIGINAL 
Lora Barker, Certified Cour 
/ 4-^ 
[ 1] car, and than Mr Oastrup or somabody aisa comas up and it 
[ 2] looks lika thayra going totryandgat in thacarand ramova 
[ 3 ] tha car, than I think thara's axigant arcumstancaa. At that 
[ 4] point I think tha car can probably ba satoad undar tha 
( 5] automobia axcapdon. 
[ 6] Undar thasa facts, no. I think that what was 
[ 7] raquirad was that tha Stata naadad to go put objactiva facta 
[ 8] in front of a judga and obtain a saarch warrant to saoa that 
[ 9] v*h&* and than to subaaquantfy saarch it 
[10] I don't think that tha Chambara taat ia mat I 
[11] ihNt**cM»%m*f*ct*k*m**»l+ocmiam. And 
[12] I think Mr. Raamussan mdic t a n that Chambara oTacuaaaa 
[13] Laftocco. 
[14] TVC COURT: Or Andarson diacuaaaa. 
[15] MR. ELDROQt Ooaa Andarson cSscuss it? 
[16] THE COURT: Isn't Chambara a U.S. caaa? 
[17] MR. RASMU890* Chamban ia a Uhliad Statss Circuit 
[18] Court caaa. 
[19] MR. BJDROQt Of court*, LaRocco inctcatas that 
[20] undar Ar te * I of our Utah CoriaSAiion that tham'a a mora 
[21] protacaVa standard of our privacy imaraat So parhapa our 
[22] standard in Utah ia a Mia mow atrtcst than tha fladaraJ 
[23] standard 
[24] I juat tt*. your Honor, tat tha facia aa 
[25] aatabiahad hara today and at tha praiiranary haaring daarty 
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[ 1] show than) waro no axigant arcumatancao. i think axigant 
( 2] cacumatancaa raojuJn) aomo aftJcuJablo facai to ojlvo ait 
J J on*ca> reason v oaaovo wa» awoanco m yua^j w no 
[ 4] daatoyad or movad. And tora'a juat nona of that ham. 
[ 5] Thara's juat maro apacutaion about what Mr. Oaatrup or 
[ 0] Mr. — wnoavar tjaa othar inoMoual woa, lyajf, what ha may 
[ 7 ] or may not hava dona* or what othar paopla may or may not 
[ 8] hava dona, tharo'a no raaJ avidanoa to inggiat that that 
[ 9] vahida waa in raaf dangar of baing movad •apaciaty if 
[10] thara's a poico oflcar tharo to waach ovar it and maka sura 
[11] if s not mowast And V aomaooaV dkf approach tha vanksia. i 
[12] think tha oftoar daaHy at t u t point could hava takan 
[13] furtharactat 
[14] And wsn that m sit down 
[15] T W COURT Anything aa* . Mr. Raamuaaan? 
[18] MR.RASMUSS8* No, I'd submit it 
[17] THE COURT: AM right Mr. Bdrtdga, in looking at 
[18] your own mamo, which tjrrtoffunatary ia not pagfciatad so i 
[19] cant tad axactfy how many pagaa down I am. I'm about 
[20] halfway through it At tha bottom of a poga you wrtta - or 
[21] your dark wrota that "tha axigant drcumstancaa axcaption 
[22] doasnt apply in this casa." And than you grva us savarai 
[23] definitions 'Exigant ctrcumstancas sxist only whan tha 
[24] inavrtabia daiay incidant to obtaining a warrant must grva 
| [25] way to an urgant naad for immadiata action.0 That's a Utah 
[ 1] casa. 1996. Stata varsus Wails, citing Umtad Siataa versus 
[ 2] Sattarflald. an 11th Circuit Court casa from 1984 And than 
[ 3] you hava in pararahasis, 'saa also Cooiidga varsus 
[ 4] Naw Hampshire/ which contains tha sama dtflnrton that tha 
[ 5] Stata has quotad from Chambars. Exigant ctrcumstancas 
[ 6] appfiaa whara an automobHa is stoppad on tha highway 'whara 
[ 7] thara is probabla causa bacausa tha car is movabia. tha 
[ 8] occupants ara aiartad. and tha car's contams may navar ba 
[ 9] found again if tha warrant must ba obtainad' 
[10] And than you writs. "Utah courts hava idanallad 
[11] axamplaa about what cumtttutas axigant cJrcumstancas. Tha 
[12] immaojata naad to pnjvant harm to tha orllcars. dastruction 
[13] of tha avidanca. or aacapa of tha suspoct* So as I saa your 
[14] two mamoa, I thMe wo ara focusing on saying concams about 
[15] what crsatas axigant drcumatancaa. 
[18] I and In thla incidant 8iat tftaro wam mdaad 
[17] axigant ulrcumatantaa. Wo hava a vary lata hour* or early 
[18] morning hour of approximately midnight or 1 o'clock. 
[19] I undaratand your argumant about occupants, 
[20] Mr. Sdridga. but I think tha Oafaodant although this isn't 
[21] a stop at * » aida of tha road, I think tha Oaflandant stands 
[22] in tha sama placo aa an occupant who had hava baan thara if 
[23] tm car hod boon stoppad at tha skJo of tha road. Shawaa 
l « * j n a n or wnai wva yuaaj on. vxjaao* sna waa swaxanao ana 
[25 j awant aha can and har Manet or tha famay can And tha 
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[ 1] Wand or ha may juat wandar by again to usa tha car. I 
[ 2 ] thWt t w car ia at rtak of baing movad. I think if tha car 
[ 3 ] is at rtak of baing movad than wo hava a risk that thara H 
[ 4 ] bo daaOuctJon of tha avidanca. and that that starao unit 
[ 5 ] that waa so raoarajy inttaMsd wM afl a suddan disappaar. 
[ 8] Exigant drcumatancaa axiat whan tha car is movabia. 
[ 7 ] which it cartaJNy ia. I don't think tha automobaa 
[ 8] axcapacn raquiraa that tha car always ba at tha sida of tha 
[ 9] a highway. I tank it can bo in tha staat parkad. i think 
[10] it can bo in tha front of tha noma as it was hara. And 
[11] you'ra right avary car ia not subject to tha automobila 
[12] axcaptJort but I think in this casa this ona is. 
[13] I am facing that tha car's contacts might hava 
[14] navar baan found again if thara had to hava baan a wait for a 
[15] warrant Of couraa wish any stop as to your argumant that 
[18] thay could hava Ian an oflicar thara. any oflicar can ba 
[17] (aft somowhara to taka cara of a car. in tha middta of tha 
[18] doaart in tha midola of tha road. I guaas you can always 
[19] laava an oflicar thara. But I think that tha automobiia 
[20] axcaptJon by itsalf dooa not raquka that tha officars always 
[21] laava an oflicar at tha car and than go through tha 
[22] procaduras nacassary to gat a warrant whathar rt ba the 
[23] normal warrant procadura, or by taiaphonic, which I've 
[24] axpiainad to you isn't raairy that much different Ail the 
[25] taiaphonic warrant doas by Utah statute is sava tha officers 
L . j me vguofi or going 10 a juoga s noma in tne middia of tha 
[ 2] night or over to tha courthouse if it's during the daytime 
[ 3] hours But other than that they have to do everything they 
[ 4] would otherwise do. It has to be written. And even mora 
[ 5] than that they have to bring it to the judge the next day for 
[ 6] Ns inflate. The officer initials it for the judge at that 
( 7] time. Then they bring the a copy to the judge to initial and 
[ 8] back data the next day. So it's a very elaborate procedure 
[ 9 ] and not something that exists where you carl up the judge and 
[10] teM him over the phone what's going on and he says: Sure. 
[11] you can search. 
[12] I the* that the fee* aa offered - and I wal 
[13] adopt the facia. And I'm going to have you write tWa 
[14] ruling. Mr. Raamuasaa I wM adopt the fee* that ts found 
[15] in the memorandum offered by the S IM today. Counsel for 
[16] the Defendant has indteated that thoee fa<* were acceptable. 
[17] And I find It of greet Importance that thJe 
[18] Defender* had bean identified - by someone who knew her-
[19] eerier in the day aa being present with tie person who wee 
[20] using the card from Duatjn Oeetrup at the time of the 
[21] instaaadon of the stereo equipment inaide the vahJde. I 
[221 think the officers vejftflad their futntetont whan thev found 
ie»ea>j vew^m te^er wvvt^^ttev v^aoea^Sjtejej ojaeeee owaejo^p^evmwtea1 •w te jwe •start/ •^a^av^al 
[23] a sMIar car of the same deecrtpioa 
[24] Ma'am, could you pseaee be quiet? 
[25] MS. M M W I'm softy. 
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[ 1] THE COURT: Whan they found a car of the same 
[ 2] description at her home* aa they expected to* and Inaide the 
[ 3] car saw a stereo that had the same face plate aa had been 
[ 4] shown them by the store emppoyeee. 
[ 5] So I do find tat the officers acted appropriately 
[ 6 ] and that tfve wee a situation of exigent circuinetentoe. That 
[ 7] the search wee appropriate: fiat the talcing of the car tar 
[ 8 ] the purpose of the search wee appropriate In order to 
[ 9] preserve the evidence* proeorvo the car from being moved* 
[10] preserve the evidence from being thereafter loet 
[11] If Mr. Raamueaen would prepare an order tar 
[12] Mr. Sdrtdgo to sign off on. and then submit It to the Court 
[13] I'll sign that 
[14] Do we need to set tfts tar trial? Or do you want to 
[15] set this tar further pretrial? 
[16] MR. aDfflOGE I think we could probably just set it 
[17] for thai. 
[18] THE COURT: Okay. And my understanding is we're 
[ 19] only trying a Class A and a Class 8 misdemeanor is that 
[20] correct? 
[21] MR ELDRfOGE: I believe so, yes. 
[22] THE COURT: Count IV was lost at the preliminary 
[23] heanng, and we are here on Counts V and VI: is that correct? 
[24] MR RASMUSSBY: Yes 
[25] THE COURT And she has - from my reading of the 
[ 1] transcript she did enter not guilty pleas at the ome. 
[ 2] nght? 
[ 3] MR. BLDRIOG& Yes. 
( 4] THE COURT: So we've done the arraignment 
[ 5] How long do we want for trial? 
[ 6] MR. BDRIDGE: Probably just a day is that all 
[ 7] right? 
[ 8] MR. RASMUSSBfc That would be fine 
[ 9 ] THE CLERIC Jury trial? 
[10] THE COURT: Jury or bench? 
[11] MR. aDRtXSE Jury trial, please. 
[12] THE CLERK: August 29th at 9 o dock. 
[13] MR. RASMUSSBt Okay. 
[14] MR. ELDROGE: That wal be fine, your Honor. 
[16] TW COURT: Okay. August 29th at 9 a.m. 
[16] Ma. Mohow, I'm going to have you come over and sign 
[17] a Promiee to Appear before the Court I I order that you be 
[16] preeent at that time. And I would alao like to sat a final 
[19] pretrial about a week prior to that 
[20] THE CLERK: August 17th at 9 o'clock. 
[21] Tt€ COURT: Does that work for you August 17th at 
[22] 9 a m far a final pretrial? 
[23] MR. aDROGE: la that a Tueeday? That would be 
[24] okay. 
[26] 1>€ COURT: Okay, I would to your jury 
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I [ 1] ratrucdon* due at that tins. 
[ 2] I'm probably happy to do my own (inaudfate). If 
[ 3] you'l do ipaciala. anything that your* realy concerned 
[ 4] about and elements, that would be great 
I [ 5] Al right thank you very much. We're n recess. 
IC 01 (End of proceedhga.) 
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Addendum B 
Addendum B 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION TO 
Plaintiff, SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
vs. 
EMILY MEHEW Case No. 001404574 
Defendants. Judge Claudia Laycock 
This matter came before the Court for oral arguments on defendant's second Motion to 
Suppress on September 5,2001. The plaintiff State of Utah, was represented by its attorney, J 
Christian Rasmussen. The defendant was present and represented by Jared W. Eldridge. Having 
reviewed the file, the transcript of the preliminary hearing, the memoranda presented by both 
parties, and the oral arguments made by the parties, the Court now enters its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Officer Bean of the Provo Police Department took two report s of vehicle burglary and 
theft from Joel Clark and Dustin Dastrup. 
2. Joel Clark had done some investigation on his own and had discovered that his wife 
Linda's debit card had been used at three businesses: a Chevron gas station, Jiffy Lube, Sound 
Warehouse. Neither Joel nor Linda Clark made any purchases at Jiffy Lube or Sound Warehouse 
immediately following the burglary of his vehicle and the theft of Linda's debit card. 
3 In Dustin Dastrup's backpack, which was stolen from his vehicle, was his wallet, which 
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contained checks, credit cards and some cash. Dustin Dastrup made no purchases at Jiffy Lube or 
Sound Warehouse immediately following the theft of his backpack and its contents. 
4. Officer Bean contacted Jiffy Lube and obtained the description and license plate 
number of the car serviced, a description of the person signing the receipt, and a copy of the 
receipt on which the name "Dustin Dastrup" was signed. 
5. By running the license plate number, Officer Bean learned that the car serviced at Jiffy 
Lube was registered to the defendant, Emily Mehew. 
6. At Sound Warehouse, Officer Bean spoke to the employee who had sold stereo 
equipment to a person identifying himself as "Dustin Dastrup." This "Dustin Dastrup" used the 
same debit card that had been used at Jiffy Lube, claiming the name on the debit card, Linda 
Clark, was that of his mother. 
7. The employee from Sound Warehouse also stated that a female he later identified as 
Emily Mehew (identified through a photo display and through his prior acquaintance with the 
defendant) was with the person identified as '"Dustin Dastrup" at the time of the installation of the 
stereo equipment into the vehicle. The employee showed Officer Bean what the faceplate of the 
installed stereo system looked like. 
8. Officer Bean learned that the vehicle into which the equipment had been installed had 
the same license plate number and description as the vehicle which had been serviced at Jiffy 
Lube, i e., the defendant Emily Mehew's vehicle. 
9 Officer Bean went to the defendant's home, after having officers of the Orem Police 
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Department drive by her address and verify that a vehicle matching the description of the car 
described by employees of Jiffy Lube and Sound Warehouse was at her home. 
10. When he arrived at the defendant's home, he looked through the window of the 
vehicle and observed an installed stereo which matched the face plate of the stereo shown to him 
at Sound Warehouse. 
11 At this point of the investigation, Officer Bean still did not know the true identity of 
the person identifying himself as "Dustin Dastrup" at Jiffy Lube and Sound Warehouse. 
12. Officer Bean then went to the door of the home and was admitted by family members. 
13. Defendant's sister told the officer that defendant was asleep. In response to his 
question, defendant's mother and sister also told him that the defendant's boyfriend's name was 
"Tyson," but that they did not know his last name. 
14. The defendant eventually came upstairs and spoke with the officer, admitting that she 
had been at Sound Warehouse with '"Dustin," and then later admitting that his name was really 
"Tyson." She refused to give the officer Tyson's last name, his address, or any additional 
information about him. 
15. The defendant and her family members told the officer that Tyson had access to the 
vehicle and that he borrowed it from time to time 
16. As a result of the interview, Officer Bean seized the vehicle located at the defendant's 
home-the vehicle which matched the description of the vehicle seen at the two businesses. 
17 During an inventory search of the vehicle, he found various items which had been 
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stolen in the two vehicle burglaries. 
DISCUSSION 
L State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1993) 
Defendant argues that the search of her vehicle was constitutionally unjustifiable because, 
when Officer Bean went to defendant's home, interviewed her, and alerted her and her family 
members regarding their investigation, Officer Bean created an exigency in order to justify a 
warrantless search of her vehicle. Defendant relies upon the reasoning in State v. Beavers, 859 
P 2d 9 (Utah App. 1993) and Idaho v. Kelly, 963 P.2d 1211 (Idaho Ct of App. 1998). Plaintiff 
responds that Beavers and Kelly can be distinguished factually and, therefore, do not apply to the 
instant case. 
In Beavers police officers responded to an apartment building for a report of a loud 
argument and a possible assault. Upon arriving at the subject apartment, the officers noticed a 
broken door jam, a door that was ajar, and male voices arguing inside. The officers listened for 2-
4 minutes outside the slightly opened door, "during which time they heard an argument over the 
price of coats." Id at 11. The officers heard nothing which confirmed the possibility of an 
assault or other violence, but they continued to listen. When one of the males stepped through 
the door of the apartment into the hallway, he saw the officers and immediately "stepped back 
across the threshold about a half an arm length into the apartment." Id One of the officers 
reached across the threshold and grabbed the male's shoulder, throwing him to the ground and 
detaining him. At that time he saw 3 more people inside the apartment, two of whom immediately 
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fled out of view. Because he feared for the safety of the officers present, he and another officer 
entered the apartment with guns drawn and seized all three occupants. While checking the rest of 
the apartment for other persons, he found a large number of coats, which were determined to be 
stolen. 
In the instant case, the defendant's one-paragraph analysis of the Beavers court's legal 
reasoning jumps directly to the holding that the "police cannot create the exigency in order to 
justify a warrantless entry." Id at 18. This Court believes that leaping immediately to a 
consideration of that issue ignores the majority of the analysis outlined by the appellate court. 
The Court first considered the following issue: 
whether the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless entry into a private 
residence on the basis of reasonable, articulable suspicion-the level of suspicion 
necessary to justify an investigatory Terry stop-or whether such an entry is 
justified solely on the basis of probable cause and exigent circumstances. 
Id at 13. After noting that the officer's reaching across the threshold of the apartment to seize 
the retreating male was a seizure occurring "within the constitutionally protected confines of a 
private residence, where citizens enjoy a heightened expectation of privacy," id, the court quoted 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587-590 (1967) for the concept that u[a]bsent exigent 
circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant" and that, even 
when exigency exists, the Fourth Amendment always requires probable cause as a basis for entry 
into a private residence. Beavers at 13-14. 
The Beavers court then rejected the State's argument that "hot pursuit" required only 
articulable (reasonable) suspicion (and, in a footnote, rejected the notion that "hot pursuit" had 
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actually occurred in the Beavers facts), finding that an "extension of the Terry doctrine to 
warrantless entries of private premises is contrary to Fourth Amendment principles." Id at 17. 
The Court then turned to an analysis of whether the officers' seizure inside the apartment in 
Beavers was justified under establish Fourth Amendment principles, i.e., whether such an entry 
was justified solely on the basis of probable cause and exigent circumstances. 
The Beavers court defined exigent circumstances as those 
that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry... was necessary to 
prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant 
evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly 
frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts. 
Id at 18, quoting United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195,1199 (9* Cir. 1984). The facts in 
Beavers required analysis only under the factor dealing with preventing physical harm to the 
officers. The Court noted that the "existence of exigent circumstances must be based on the 
reasonable belief of the police officer/9 and that any 'legitimate concern which police claim for 
their safety must of necessity arise before the challenged entry." Id at 18, cites omitted. And, 
finally, the Court noted thai "police cannot create the exigency in order to justify a warrantless 
entry." Id, cite omitted 
In it analysis of the facts in Beaver, the Court held that any threat to police safety must 
have arisen before the officer reached across the threshold to seize the male occupant as he 
stepped back into the apartment; indeed, the Court found that no such threat to police safety 
occurred until after the officer reached across the threshold and saw the two of the three 
occupants running to hide. Furthermore, the officer's own testimony belied his claim that he had 
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a reasonable belief that he was in danger; he testified that he "did not think to look for weapons." 
Id at 19. 
Because the Court found that exigent circumstances could not justify the police intrusion 
in Beavers, the Court reversed and remanded the matter without addressing the other prong of the 
test-probable cause for the entry into the apartment. 
0 . /feaver? and the instant case 
This Court finds that Beavers and the instant case are quite different factually. Beavers 
deals very specifically in its facts and analysis with the Fourth Amendment and warrantless 
searches of residences, not vdiides. In the instant case, the entry into the home where defendant 
was residing was made with consent, not through force or surprise. Officer Bean was allowed 
into the home by the defendant's mother and sister as he merely continued his investigation into 
the facts surrounding the use of Linda Clark's debit card ami the unauthorized use of Dustin 
Dastrup's name. The home was never seized, there was no warrantless entry into the home, nor 
did Officer Bean exploit a warrantless entry into the home to further create an exigency in order 
to justify a warrantless seardi and seizure of the home. He did not continue past the mother and 
sister further into the home in order to find the defendant, who was sleeping downstairs when he 
first arrived, nor did he find anything of evidentiary nature while in the home. 
It is the defendant's argument that the officer, as per Beavers, created exigent 
circumstances when he went into the home to interview the defendant-when he obtained 
information through his interviews with the defendant, her mother, and her sister that gave him 
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reason to believe that the not-completely-identified 'Tyson" might have ready access to the car, 
which would lead to the destruction of relevant evidence. It is also the defendant's position that 
Beavers would have required the officer to obtain a search warrant for the vehicle before he ever 
attempted to interview the defendant, thereby avoiding the possibility of creating the exigency 
which lead to the warrantless search of the vehicle. 
This Court believes that the defendant's arguments are an effort to impermissibly 
"bootstrap" the facts of the instant matter into Beavers. Defendant seeks to determine the order 
in which the officer proceeds with his investigation, i.e., whether he interviews a possible 
accomplice first or obtains a search warrant for her vehicle. Because defendant believes that the 
officer had obtained enough information for a search warrant of the vehicle before knocking on 
the defendant's door, defendant argues that Beavers would require the officer to delay the 
interview of defendant until after he had alerted her to the investigation by searching the vehicle. 
In other words, defendant seeks to place the officer in a "Catch 22." Under this theory, had the 
officer searched the car first with the aid of a search warrant, he would have alerted the defendant, 
created an exigency, probably requiring an arrest, and any information he could obtained from the 
defendant thereafter would have been subject to suppression. 
Furthermore, it is clear to this Court that the information the officer received inside the 
house was given to him voluntarily by the defendant, her mother and sister. The mother and sister 
could not tell him "Tyson's" last name because they did not know it. The defendant chose not to 
give the officer the information he sought. The officer took no overt actions, as in Beavers, 
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which were the result of a warrantless entry into the defendant's home. It was the information 
given or not given by the defendant and her family which created any concern on the part of the 
officer, leading to the warrantless search of the vehicle. 
Lastly, in Beavers the Court held that any threat to police safety must have arisen before 
the officer reached across the threshold to seize the male occupant as he stepped back into the 
apartment. Using that analysis, it is clear that any threat of possible destruction of evidence to be 
found in the vehicle arose before the officer ever knocked on the door to interview the defendant. 
'Tyson's" accessibility to the vehicle was a fact in existence even before the officer discovered 
that Tyson," apparently, had ready access to the vehicle. The officer's questions did not create 
the possibility that 'Tyson" would take off with the car, that was a feet already in existence. 
Tyson" had used the car before and would use it again, regardless of the officer's questions that 
night. The only feet that was added was that the defendant or her family members might tell him 
that an investigation was ongoing, giving "Tyson** a reason not to return the car, as he had always 
done before. 
Clearly, Beavers vm meant to apply to cases dealing with the warantless entry of officers 
into residences^ not vetidet. This Court finds that Beavers does not apply to the instant case, 
that the officer did not create an exigency when he interviewed the defendant in the course of his 
investigation, and that he lawfully seized the vehicle, based on probable cause and exigent 
circumstances, pursuant to the Court's ruling on the defendant's first Motion to Suppress. 
UL Idaho v. Kelly, 9 « P.2d 1211 (Idaho Ct of A pp. 1998) 
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Defendant also relies on Idaho v. Kelly, 963 P.2d 1211 (Idaho Ct. of App. 1998) for the 
same reasoning and arguments. As per its reasoning above, this Court finds that Kelly does not 
apply. It, too, is a case which deals with a warrantless entry into a suspect's home. Kelly goes 
even one step further in its analysis than Beavers, finding that the officer's knock upon the 
suspect's door alerted the suspect to the officer's presence and, thereby, created exigent 
circumstances. This Court does not believe that Beavers justifies a similar conclusion. To apply 
that reasoning to Beavers, the officers' mere presence outside the door of the apartment in 
Beavers would have created exigent circumstances; the Beavers Court clearly found that it was 
the officer's reaching across the threshold and viewing the fleeing occupants, which created the 
exigency. At any rate, this Court still believes that both Kelly and Beavers are inapplicable to the 
instant case, as their analyses deal with warrantless entries into residences, rather than vehicles. 
IV. Conclusion 
Therefore, the Court concludes that there was no warrantless entry into or search or 
seizure of the defendant's residence and that the investigating officer did not create an exigent 
circumstance in order to justify a seizure of the defendant's vehicle. The Court DENIES 
defendant's second Motion to Suppress. 
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